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I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout the history of criminal justice, the right to counsel
has been expansive. The injustice that would result from severe
limitations or deprivations of this right would make life intolera-
ble in a free society. Ours is an era that requires personal control
over important issues in each individual's life, yet a constitutional
limitation has been imposed upon the indigent defendant's con-
trol over his own appeal when the right to appointed counsel is
invoked.
In Jones v. Barnes,1 the United States Supreme Court was
asked to determine whether court-appointed appellate counsel
must raise every nonfrivolous issue requested by the indigent
criminal defendant. The Court ruled that the indigent defendant
has no constitutional right to demand such control. Prior to
Barnes, there existed no holding based squarely upon constitu-
tional grounds,2 leaving the division of decision-making power be-
tween client and counsel to be governed primarily by the legal
profession's ethical codes. 3
1. 103 S. Ct. 3308 (1983).
2. Id. at 3317 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
3. Inconsistencies in the following ethical codes and standards were noted in
the Barnes decision:
The American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct pro-
vide, in pertinent part:
A lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of
representation . . . and shall consult with the client as to the means by
which they are to be pursued .... In a criminal case, the lawyer for the
defendant shall abide by the client's decision, after consultation with the
lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether
the client will testify.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a) (Final Draft 1982) (emphasis
added).
The American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility ethical consid-
erations provide in part:
EC 7-7. In certain areas of legal representation not affecting the merits of
the cause or substantially prejudicing the rights of a client, a lawyer is en-
titled to make decisions on his own. But otherwise the authority to make
Barnes' significance is two-pronged: first, it creates a clear con-
stitutional rule to be applied in conflicts between appointed coun-
sel and the indigent defendant; second, it defines the
constitutional scope of control by court-appointed counsel in the
presentation of the defense of an indigent criminal defendant.
The Barnes decision announced the rule that court-appointed ap-
pellate counsel is not required by the Constitution to raise all
nonfrivolous issues, even if requested by the indigent criminal
defendant.4
In analyzing the Supreme Court's decision in Barnes, this note
traces the history of the right to effective assistance of counsel for
the indigent criminal defendant by examining constitutional,
decisions is exclusively that of the client and, if made within the frame-
work of the law, such decisions are binding on his lawyer. . . . A defense
lawyer in a criminal case has the duty to advise his client fully on whether
a particular plea to a charge appears to be desirable and as to the pros-
pects of success on appeal, but it is for the client to decide what plea
should be entered and whether an appeal should be taken.
ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-7 (1980) (emphasis
added).
EC 7-8. A lawyer should exert his best efforts to [einsure that decisions
of his client are made only after the client has been informed of relevant
considerations .... In the final analysis, however, the lawyer should al-
ways remember that the decision whether to forego legally available objec-
tives or methods because of nonlegalfactors is ultimately for the client and
not for himself.
Id. at EC 7-8 (emphasis added).
The American Bar Association Defense Function Standards provide:
Standard 4-5.2. Control and direction of the case.
(a) Certain decisions relating to the conduct of the case are ultimately for
the accused and others are ultimately for defense counsel. The decisions
which are to be made by the accused after full consultation with counsel
are:
(i) what plea to enter;
(ii) whether to waive jury trial; and
(iii) whether to testify in his own behalf.
(b) The decisions on what witnesses to call, whether and how to conduct
cross-examination, what jurors to accept or strike, what trial motions
should be made, and all other strategic and tactical decisions are the ex-
clusive province of the lawyer after consultation with the client.
(c) If a disagreement on significant matters of tactics or strategy arises
between the lawyer and the client, the lawyer should make a record of the
circumstances, the lawyer's advice and reasons, and the conclusion
reached. The record should be made in a manner which protects the con-
fidentiality of the lawyer-client relationship.
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4-5.2 (2d ed. 1980) (emphasis added).
The American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Appeals provides in the
commentary in pertinent part:
[A] question arises when, in the estimate of counsel, the decision of the
client to take an appeal, or the client's decision to press a particular con-
tention on appeal, is incorrect. Counsel has the professional duty to give
to the client fully and forcefully an opinion concerning the case and its
probable outcome. Counsel's role, however, is to advise. The decision is
made by the client.
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 21-3.2 at 21-42 (2d ed. 1980) (emphasis added).
4. 103 S. Ct. at 3312.
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practical, and ethical considerations. Furthermore, this note
probes questions raised by the decision and some predictions of
future ramifications for the indigent defendant and the criminal
justice system.
II. THE PROBLEM
A. The State Court Proceedings
In 1976, David Barnes was convicted of first and second degree
robbery and second degree assault of Richard Butts. 5 The state's
case focused primarily on the testimony of Butts, who identified
Barnes as one of his four assailants. 6 On cross-examination,
court-appointed defense counsel sought to impeach Butts' credi-
bility by introducing a psychiatric report which suggested that
Butts had a history of "blacking out." The trial court, sua sponte,7
instructed Butts not to answer any questions regarding psychiat-
ric treatment, and defense counsel did not make an offer of proof
on the substance or relevance of the question.8
Barnes' case relied primarily on the defendant's own testimony;
he stated that he was at home with his father at the time of the
robbery. Defense counsel did not call Barnes' father as a witness
or allude to the alibi testimony in the summation argument.9 At
the close of the trial, the judge declined defense counsel's request
for a jury instruction on accessorial liability.10
5. Jones v. Barnes, 103 S. Ct. at 3310. Butts was robbed at knifepoint and
badly beaten by four men in the lobby of an apartment building. Id. The three
other alleged assailants were never apprehended. Respondent's Brief at 3, id.
6. 665 F.2d 427, 429 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 3308 (1983). After testifying
falsely about where he had been immediately preceeding the robbery, Butts recal-
led that Barnes was the one who grabbed him from behind. Butts conceded that
Barnes was not the man who took his watch and that he did not know which of the
four actually took his money. Id.
The trial judge concluded that the in-court identification was based on an in-
dependent source because Butts had known Barnes for several years prior to the
robbery. This identification was critical because the court found Butts' previous
bedside identification of Barnes to have been "the worst possible way of having a
showing made." Id.
7. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1277 (rev. 5th ed. 1979) defines sua sponte as
"[o] f his or its own will or motion; voluntarily; without prompting or suggestion."
8. 103 S. Ct. at 3310.
9. Barnes v. Jones, 665 F.2d at 430 (2d Cir.), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 3308 (1983).
10. The charge was apparently to read as follows: "[a] defendant cannot be
held criminally liable for the acts of another unless he knew of the acts and in-
tended the result." Id.
B. The Appeal to the Appellate Division
Barnes' application for leave to appeal informa pauperis" was
granted by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New
York. New counsel was assigned to prosecute his appeal.' 2
Barnes sent a letter to his counsel listing four substantive issues
that he believed should be raised, including ineffectiveness of
trial counsel.' 3 In addition, Barnes enclosed a supplemental pro
se 14 brief.'5 The new appellate counsel replied in writing that he
had rejected most of the suggested claims, 16 including the ineffec-
tiveness of trial counsel issue,17 because the claim was not based
on evidence in the record.18 Counsel then listed seven potential
claims of error which he considered raising on appeal.' 9 The brief
and oral argument presented by counsel to the Appellate Division
concentrated on three of the seven points he had raised in his let-
ter to Barnes. 20 The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction by
11. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 701 (rev. 5th ed. 1979) defines in forma pauperis
as follows:
In the character or manner of a pauper. Describes permission given to a
poor person (i.e. indigent) to proceed without liability for court fees or
costs. An indigent will not be deprived of his rights to litigate and appeal;
if the court is satisfied as to his indigence he may proceed without incur-
ring costs or fees of court. FED. R. CRIM. P, 44.
Id.
For a discussion concerning indigency, see infra note 38.
12. 665 F.2d at 430.
13. 103 S. Ct. at 3310. For a discussion of effective assistance of counsel see
generally Note, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Resulting from Conflicts Between
Court-Appointed Counsel and Indigent Defendant-State v. Hutchins, 18 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 83 (1982).
Barnes also requested that his counsel raise the following issues: (1) improper
cross-examination by the prosecutor; (2) failure to supress the identification testi-
mony given by Butts; and (3) the trial court's improper exclusion of the psychiat-
ric evidence. Respondent's Brief at 4, Jones v. Barnes, 103 S. Ct. 3310.
14. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1099 (rev. 5th ed. 1979) defines pro se in part as:
"[f or himself; in his own behalf; in person."
15. 103 S. Ct. at 3310. Counsel did not necessarily agree with all of the points
made in the brief. 665 F.2d at 430.
16. Counsel indicated that he would not argue that the show-up was unconsti-
tutional, but that he would argue that the facts relative to Butts' prior acquain-
tance with Barnes did not substantiate an independent identification. 665 F.2d at
430.
17. See infra note 28.
18. 665 F.2d at 430. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated this was a mis-
take, as counsel could have returned to the trial court in a coram nobis proceeding
to supplement the record if necessary. Id. at 430 n.l.
19. 103 S. Ct. at 3310.
20. Id. at 3311. The three claims were: (1) improper exclusion of psychiatric
evidence; (2) failure to supress Butts' identification testimony; and (3) improper
cross-examination of Barnes by the trial judge.
These claims did not include any of the arguments raised in Barnes' original pro
se brief or in two subsequent pro se briefs which raised three more of the seven
issues which assigned counsel had identified. Id.
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summary order.21
C. Subsequent State and Federal Proceedings
Barnes moved for a writ of habeas corpus 22 in the Federal Dis-
trict Court in New York, raising the substantive issues addressed
in his original pro se brief.23 After considering the ineffectiveness
of trial counsel claim in light of the "farce and mockery" stan-
dard,24 the district court denied the writ.25
Subsequently, Barnes filed complaints in the state and federal
courts, claiming for the first time that his appellate counsel had
provided ineffective assistance.26 Barnes first petitioned the state
court of appeals for reconsideration, which was denied.27 He then
returned to the federal district court for a writ of habeas corpus,
which was also denied.28 A divided panel of the court of appeals
21. New York v. Barnes, 63 A.D.2d 865, 405 N.Y.S.2d 621, appeal denied, 45
N.Y.2d 786, 381 N.E.2d 179, 409 N.Y.S.2d 1044 (1978). See also 665 F.2d at 430.
22. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 638 (rev. 5th ed. 1979), defines habeas corpus, in
pertinent part, as:
[T]he name given to a variety of writs ... having for their object to bring
a party before a court or judge .... The primary function of the writ is to
'release from unlawful imprisonment .... The office of the writ is not to
determine prisoner's guilt or innocence, and [the] only issue which it
presents is whether [the] prisoner is restrained of his liberty by due
process.
Id.
23. One of the claims raised in the brief was ineffectiveness of trial counsel.
665 F.2d at 430.
24. The "farce and mockery" standard is one of two prevailing tests among the
lower courts to determine effective assistance of counsel, a right expressly recog-
nized by the Supreme Court in 1942. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
The standard requires that defense counsel's inadequate performance be "of such
a kind as to shock the conscience of the Court and make the proceedings a farce
and mockery of justice." United States v. Wight, 176 F.2d 376, 379 (2d Cir. 1949),
cert. denied, 338 U.S. 950 (1950).
Although all federal courts of appeals have, in some form, relied on this stan-
dard at some time, all but the Second Circuit have abandoned the standard. See
Note, supra note 13, at 89-90 nn.57-59. The new standard adopted by the courts
was the "reasonableness" standard. The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, for example, requires that the assisting counsel be a reasonably competent
advocate for the defendant. Id. at 91. The exact standard of reasonableness may
vary from court to court. Id. at 90 nn.60-62.
25. United States ex rel. Barnes v. Jones, No. 78-C-1717 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), affd,
607 F.2d 994 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 853 (1979).
26. 103 S. Ct. at 3311. In the meantime, Barnes had filed a motion in the trial
court for collateral review of his sentence, which was denied. Id.
27. New York v. Barnes, 49 N.Y.2d 1001, 406 N.E.2d 1083, 429 N.Y.S.2d 1029
(1980).
28. United States ex rel. Barnes v. Jones, No. 80-C-2447 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 665
reversed.29 Laying down a new standard, the majority held the
willful refusal of appointed counsel to raise colorable issues on
appeal, despite insistence from his indigent client to do so, was a
deprivation of the constitutional right to the assistance of
counsel.30
The court of appeals expressly based its decision on Anders v.
California,3 1 which had barred an attorney from withdrawing
from a nonfrivolous appeal.3 2 The majority concluded that if
counsel could not abandon a nonfrivolous appeal, neither could
the attorney abandon a nonfrivolous issue on appeal.33
The Supreme Court granted certiorari34 and subsequently re-
versed the lower court's decision in Jones v. Barnes. 35 In an opin-
ion written by Chief Justice Burger, the Court held that an
indigent defendant has no constitutional right to compel ap-
pointed counsel to press nonfrivolous points if, as a matter of pro-
fessional judgment, counsel decides not to present those claims.36
F.2d 427 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 3308 (1983). The district court found appel-
late counsel's performance adequate even under the more lenient standard of
"reasonable competence" adopted by other circuits and proposed by some judges
in the Second Circuit. 665 F.2d at 431. See also Note, supra note 13, at 88-93, for a
discussion of the "reasonable competence" standard for attorney effectiveness.
29. 665 F.2d at 427 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 3308 (1983). By this time, at
least twenty-six state and federal judges had rejected Barnes' claim that he was
unjustly convicted of a crime committed five years earlier. 103 S. Ct. at 3311 n.3.
30. 665 F.2d at 433.
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution provides in pertinent
part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
The Court referred to laying down a new standard because prior to Jones v.
Barnes, 665 F.2d at 427, decisions regarding legal issues on appeal were ultimately
left to the lawyer's professional judgment. See Ennis v. LeFevre, 560 F.2d 1072,
1075 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 976 (1978).
31. 386 U.S. 738 (1967). The court of appeals did not base its decision on the
"reasonable competence" standard for evaluating attorney effectiveness, as the
district court had done. 665 F.2d at 431 n.4. See supra note 24.
32. 665 F.2d at 430. If upon conscientious examination, counsel finds the de-
fendant's appeal to be wholly frivolous, he may advise the court and request per-
mission to withdraw; the brief to this effect has come to be known as the Anders
brief. Id. For a critique of the use of the Anders brief, see Mendelson, Frivolous
Criminal Appeals: The Anders Brief or the Idaho Rule?, 19 CRIM. L. BuLL. 22 (1983).
33. 665 F.2d at 430. Judge Meskill dissented, stating that the majority had
overextended Anders. In his view, Anders concerned only whether an attorney
must pursue nonfrivolous appeals, not issues. Id. at 437.
34. 457 U.S. 1104 (1982).
35. 103 S. Ct. at 3308.
36. Id. at 3312.
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III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. The Right to Court-Appointed Counsel37
1. A Sixth Amendment Requirement
The sixth amendment provides, in part, that "[ijn all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defense." 3 8 Based on this provision,
the constitutional right of an indigent defendant to the assistance
of a court-appointed counsel was first established in the United
States 3 9 in the 1932 case of Powell v. Alabama.40 The Powell Court
37. Most of the decisions dealing with the right to counsel have been
concerned with court-appointed counsel assisting the indigent defendant rather
than privately retained counsel in assisting the more affluent defendant.
38. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Although the Supreme Court opinions have re-
ferred to the "indigent defendant" on numerous occasions, no special definition of
"indigency" has ever been offered by the Court. Lower courts have, however,
ruled on the issue of determining indigency. See, e.g., People v. Eggers, 27 Ill. 2d
85, 188 N.E.2d 30 (1963) (a defendent should be classified as indigent if his avail-
able resources are not sufficient to both retain counsel and to post bond); McCraw
v. State, 476 P.2d 370 (Okla. 1970) (the owner of assets does not have to be desti-
tute before he can be classified as indigent).
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 695 (rev. 5th ed. 1979), defines indigent defendant as:
A person indicted or complained of who is without funds or ability to hire
a lawyer to defend him and who, in most instances, is entitled to ap-
pointed counsel, consistent with the protection of the Sixth and Four-
teenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 [(1963)].
Id.
There is an absolute right to retained counsel at a criminal trial in both state
and federal courts. In federal courts, the right is guaranteed by the sixth amend-
ment; in state courts, it is guaranteed by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment and by state constitutional provisions. See Comment, An Historical
Argument for the Right to Counsel During Police Interrogation, 73 YALE L.J. 1000,
1003 (1964).
The Supreme Court has characterized the right to retain counsel as unqualified.
See Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3, 9 (1954); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
See also Steele, The Doctrine of Right to Counsel: Its Impact on the Administra-
tion of Criminal Justice and The Legal Profession, 23 Sw. L.J. 488, 496-501 (1969).
39. Parliament gave a defendant accused of treason the right to a court-ap-
pointed counsel in 1695. 7 & 8 Will. 3, cl. 3, § 1 (1695). This right was extended to
all felony cases involving an indigent defendant in 1903. 3 Edw. 7, ch. 38, § 1 (1903).
See Note, Right to Counsel: A New Standard, 27 Sw. L.J. 406 (1973).
40. 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (indigent defendants, sentenced to death for the convic-
tion of rape, had been denied the right to counsel by failure of the trial court to
allow reasonable time and opportunity to secure counsel, consult with counsel,
and prepare a defense). The Court stated:
[I]n a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ counsel, and
is incapable adequately of making his own defense because of ignorance,
feeble mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty of the court,
whether requested or not, to assign counsel for him as a necessary requi-
carefully limited the decision to an indigent defendant accused of
a capital offense in a federal court.41
In 1938, the Supreme Court extended the right to court-ap-
pointed counsel to all indigent defendants in felony cases tried in
federal courts. 42 Subsequently, in Betts v. Brady, 43 the Court re-
fused to apply this rule to the states via the fourteenth amend-
ment.44 In 1963, however, the Court decided Gideon v.
Wainwright, 45 in which the sixth amendment right to counsel was
ultimately incorporated4 6 into the fourteenth amendment's due
process clause.47 While the Gideon opinion did not specify
whether the right was limited only to felony defendants, the case
site of due process of law; and that duty is not discharged by an assign-
ment at such a time or under such circumstances as to preclude the giving
of effective aid in the preparation and trial of the case.
Id. at 71.
41. Id. at 73. Despite the limited holding in the Powell opinion, affirmation of
the need for the appointment of counsel, generally, was made. The Court stated:
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no
skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, gener-
ally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He
is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he
may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompe-
tent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissi-
ble. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his
defense, even though he [has] a perfect one. He requires the guiding
hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him.
Id. at 69 (emphasis added).
42. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). This case has frequently been cited
for establishing the test for waiver as knowing and intelligent. "The determination
of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must de-
pend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that
case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused." Id. at
464. The Court also recognized that the federal courts lacked "the power and au-
thority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty unless he has or waives the
assistance of counsel." Id. at 463.
43. 316 U.S. 455 (1942) (the defendant, convicted of robbery, was denied ap-
pointment of counsel at the trial because he was a man of ordinary intelligence,
familiar with the courts due to a prior conviction of larceny, and was able to ade-
quately represent his own case).
44. Id. The majority held that due process did not require counsel to be ap-
pointed in all criminal cases, but only where the absence of counsel would result
in a trial lacking in "fundamental fairness." Id. at 473. Due process, the Court said
is:
[A] concept less rigid and more fluid than those [concepts] envisaged in
other specific and particular provisions of the Bill of Rights .... Asserted
denial is to be tested by an appraisal fo the totality of facts in a given case.
That which may, in one setting, constitute a denial of fundamental fair-
ness, shocking to the universal sense of justice, may, in other circum-
stances ... fall short of such denial.
Id. at 462.
45. 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (the defendant was convicted of a non-capital felony in
a Florida state court after he was denied assistance of appointed counsel).
46. Made obligatory upon the states by the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 340
(quoting Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. at 471 (1942)).
47. The result was the demise of fundamental fairness as the standard which
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itself involved a felony prosecution.48
Confusion concerning the rights of an indigent defendant ac-
cused of a misdemeanor developed after the Gideon decision.
Consequently, the courts were sharply divided49 as to whether
Gideon should be interpreted narrowly or broadly.5O The
Supreme Court, however, repeatedly denied certiorari.5 1 The
courts were free to develop their own standards for application of
court-appointed counsel to criminal indigent defendants. 52
In 1972, the Supreme Court clarified the confusion concerning
the application of Gideon. In Argersinger v. Hamlin, 53 the Court
held that, absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may
be imprisoned for any offense-petty crime, misdemeanor, or fel-
ony-unless he was represented by counsel at his trial.54 The
Court rejected the state's contention that the sixth amendment
determined whether a defendant should have counsel at trial in state courts. The
Gideon standard is an absolute standard. Id.
In the years following Betts and prior to Gideon, decisions had so frequently
found the "special circumstances" necessary to require appointment of counsel
that the Betts rule was no longer a reality. Id. at 350-51 (Harlan, J., concurring).
See Comment, Right to Counsel: The Impact of Gideon v. Wainwright in the Fifty
States, 3 CREIGHTON L. REV. 103, 104 nn.11-12 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Com-
ment, Impact of Gideon 1.
48. 372 U.S. at 336-37.
49. For a survey of the state and federal courts' treatment of the right to coun-
sel after Gideon, see Comment, Impact of Gideon, supra note 47.
50. The narrow interpretation by some courts as requiring appointment of
counsel only for the indigent felon was based on Gideon's felony charge. E.g., City
of Toledo v. Frazier, 10 Ohio App. 2d 51, 226 N.E.2d 777 (1967); Cortinez v. Flournoy,
249 La. 741, 190 So. 2d 909 (1966).
The broad interpretation by other courts had resulted from the broad language
in Gideon which makes reference to "crime" and to "any person hauled into court,
who is too poor to hire a lawyer." 372 U.S. at 344. See, e.g., City of Tacoma v.
Heater, 67 Wash. 2d 736, 409 F.2d 867 (1966); People v. Letterio, 16 N.Y.2d 307, 213
N.E.2d 670, 266 N.Y.S.2d 368 (1965).
A third view, between the narrow and broad interpretations of Gideon, held that
the right to counsel exists for non-felons where the punishment might be serious.
E.g., Irvin v. State, 44 Ala. App. 101, 203 So. 2d 283 (1967); State v. Anderson, 96
Ariz. 123, 392 P.2d 784 (1964).
51. E.g., Heller v. Connecticut, 389 U.S. 902 (1967); DeJoseph v. Connecticut,
385 U.S. 982 (1966); Winters v. Beck, 385 U.S. 907 (1966).
52. Basically, there were two general standards: whether the offense was seri-
ous or petty. For further discussion of the standards see Note, Right to Counsel,
supra note 39, at 407. See also Comment, Impact of Gideon, supra note 47, at 105-
10.
53. 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (the indigent defendant had been denied the right to
court-appointed counsel by the Florida court for an offense for which he was con-
victed and sentenced to serve 90 days in jail).
54. Id. at 37.
right to counsel, like the sixth amendment right to a jury trial,
should not apply to "petty offenses" even where a jail sentence is
imposed.55 The holding in Argersinger was specifically limited to
cases involving loss of liberty, further clarifying the earlier confu-
sion in the wake of Gideon. 5 6
2. An Equal Protection Requirement
Aside from the sixth amendment requirement of Gideon, the
appointment of counsel to assist the indigent may be required by
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment 57 and
incorporated within the fifth amendment due process clause.5 8
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment states
in part: "[N]or shall any State ... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 59 Consistent with
the nondiscriminatory function of this clause, the Supreme Court,
in Griffin v. Illinois,60 held that where a state law conditioned ap-
pellate review upon the availability of a transcript, the state must
make such transcript available without cost to the indigent de-
fendant to ensure equal access to appellate review. 61 Subse-
quently, in Douglas v. California, 62 the Court relied on Griffin to
hold that counsel must be furnished to the indigent defendant on
first appeal as a matter of right.63 Additionally, Anders v. Califor-
nia64 established the requirement that counsel may not withdraw
from an appeal he considers frivolous, unless he files a brief set-
55. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), had restricted the right to jury tri-
als to offenses punishable by six months or more. Justice Douglas in Argersinger
observed that the right to jury trial "has a different geneology and is brigaded with
a system of trial to a judge alone .... While there is historical support for limit-
ing ... trial by jury to 'serious criminal cases,' there is no such support for a simi-
lar limitation on the right to assistance of counsel." 407 U.S. at 29-30. The Court,
therefore, rejected "the premise that since prosecutions for crimes punishable by
imprisonment for less than six months may be tried without a jury, they may also
be tried without a lawyer." Id. at 30-31.
56. 407 U.S. at 37.
57. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
58. "No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
59. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
60. 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (after the indigent defendants were convicted of armed
robbery, they were denied a transcript, because the could not pay for one, as was a
necessary requirement of the state's appellate court).
61. Id. at 18-19.
62. 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (indigent defendants, jointly convicted of thirteen felo-
nies, were denied appointment of counsel to assist them on the first appeal).
63. The Court stated that "equality [is] demanded by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment where the rich man, who appeals as of right, enjoys the benefit of counsel's
examination into the record ... while the indigent . is forced to shift for him-
self." Id. at 358.
64. 386 U.S. 738 (1967). See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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ting forth the arguable issues on appeal.65 In 1974, Ross v. Moffitt66
limited the Griffin-Douglas concept of equal protection, which
had suggested that the question of appointment of counsel would
rest on the need for providing equal treatment rather than the
need for an attorney's assistance to assure a fair hearing.67 In
Ross, a divided Court68 held that the equal protection clause does
not require appointment of counsel for discretionary appellate re-
view, by either a state supreme court or the United States
Supreme Court pursuant to a petition for certiorari.69
B. The Right to Effective Assistance of Court-Appointed Counsel
The Supreme Court has indicated that the right to the assist-
ance of counsel is a right to effective assistance. The constitu-
tional guarantee of effective assistance of counsel was first
recognized as a corollary to the basic right to counsel enunciated
in Powell v. Alabama. 70 The Supreme Court has yet to explain an
overall standard for determining attorney effectiveness,7 1 address-
ing the issue instead on a case-by-case basis.72
Current standards of review used by the lower courts in deter-
mining ineffective assistance of counsel for various claims 73 have
65. Id. at 744.
66. 417 U.S. 600 (1974) (an indigent defendant was denied appointment of
counsel for review by the North Carolina Supreme Court of a conviction of forgery
in the state court).
67. Broadly construed, the Griffin-Douglas concept of equal protection could
require the appointment of counsel at every stage in a criminal proceeding where
the affluent defendent is allowed to have privately retained counsel. Thus, even
though due process may not require appointment of counsel, equal protection
would make such a requirement. See, e.g., Earnest v. Willingham, 406 F.2d 681
(10th Cir. 1966).
68. The decision was 6 to 3. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the
Court, in which Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, White, Blackmun, and
Powell joined. Justice Douglas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Bren-
nan and Marshall joined. 417 U.S. at 602.
69. Id. at 619. The Court distinguished these reviews as deciding issues of le-
gal significance, not adjudication of guilt. Id. at 615. The Court also recognized
that on application for review, the Court would have before it a transcript, the
lower court brief, and perhaps an opinion of an intermediate court. Id.
70. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
71. See United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 247 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc)
(Robinson, J., concurring), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 944 (1979).
72. See Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 21
(1973). See also Lasater, The Role of Harm in Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Cases: Practice and Policy, 32 SYRAcUSE L. REV. 759, 765 n.50 (1981).
73. See, e.g., United States v. Baynes, 622 F.2d 66 (3d Cir. 1980) (claim based on
defense counsel's failure to introduce exculpatory evidence); Brinkley v. Lefevre,
emerged in an attempt to define the Supreme Court's require-
ment of "effective assistance of counsel."74 The two prevailing
tests are the "reasonableness" 75 and the "farce and mockery" 76
standards. Most courts have abandoned the use of the latter stan-
dard77 and have adopted the "reasonableness" test for determin-
ing effective assistance of counsel.7 8 Until the Supreme Court
specifically addresses the issue and determines the level of attor-
ney competence required by the Constitution, the lower courts
will continue to use different standards in evaluating effective
assistance of appointed counsel for the indigent defendant. 79
IV. THE MAJORITY OPINION
A. Refusal to Extend Anders: A Constitutional Consideration
In Jones v. Barnes, 80 the Court based its decision on a constitu-
tional analysis of Anders v. California. 81 In the view of the major-
ity, the court of appeals8 2 had overextended Anders by holding
that appointed counsel may not abandon a nonfrivolous issue on
appeal.83
621 F.2d 45 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 868 (1980) (claim based on failure to
cross-examine a witness); Douthit v. Jones, 619 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1980) (claim
based on failure to subpoena witnesses); Henson v. United States, 617 F.2d 510
(8th Cir. 1980) (claim based on failure to present a witness); Strader v. Garrison,
611 F.2d 61 (4th Cir. 1979) (claim based on failure to advise effectively as to guilty
pleas).
74. 287 U.S. at 71-73.
75. See, e.g., McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970). See generally Note,
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, supra note 13.
76. See, e.g., Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir.) cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889
(1945). See generally Note, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, supra note 13, at 89-
90.
77. The Second Circuit is alone in requiring the farce and mockery standard,
Barnes v. Jones, 665 F.2d 427, 431 n.4 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 3308 (1983).
78. Id.
79. The decisions of this Court recognize that the right to counsel is fun-
damental to a fair trial..; and ... it is this Court's responsibility to de-
termine what level of competence satisfies the constitutional imperative.
It also follows that we should attempt to eliminate disparities in the mini-
mum quality of representation required to be provided to indigent defend-
ants. In refusing to review a case which so clearly frames an issue that
has divided the Courts of Appeals, the Court shirks its central responsibil-
ity as the court of last resort, particularly its function in the administra-
tion of criminal justice under a Constitution such as ours.
Maryland v. Marzullo, 435 U.S. 1011, 1012-13 (1978) (White, J., dissenting to denial
of certiorari).
80. 103 S. Ct. 3308 (1983).
81. 386 U.S. 738 (1967). See supra notes 32, 64 and accompanying texts.
82. Barnes v. Jones, 665 F.2d 427 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 3308 (1983).
83. Circuit Judge Meskill had dissented in Barnes v. Jones, stating:
The instant case is unlike Anders, where appellate counsel's complete re-
fusal to brief and argue claims left the defendant totally without the aid of
counsel in pressing his appeal. Here petitioner Barnes complains that his
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The Court recognized that the indigent criminal defendant has
some rights and authority, including the right to court-appointed
counsel on first appeal;8 4 ultimate authority to decide whether to
plead, waive a jury, testify in his or her own behalf, or take an ap-
peal;8 5 and the right to elect to act as his or her own advocate. 86
The Court stated, however, that "[n] either Anders nor any other
decision of this Court suggests . . . that the indigent defendant
has a constitutional right to compel appointed counsel to press
nonfrivolous points requested by the client, if counsel, as a matter
of professional judgment, decides not to present those points."8 7
B. Recognition of Court-Appointed Counsel's Professional
Judgment: A Practical and Ethical Consideration
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, cited several
practical considerations involved in determining whether an indi-
gent criminal defendant or his court-appointed counsel should se-
lect which nonfrivolous issues to present on appeal. The Court
expressed concern that the new per se rule established by the
court of appeals,8 8 which granted client control over the choice of
issues on appeal, would "seriously undermine" the ability of
counsel to present the client's case in accord with counsel's pro-
fessional judgment. Therefore, the Court held that court-ap-
pointed appellate counsel need not raise every nonfrivolous issue
requested by the client if it conflicts with his professional
judgment.8 9
To support the importance for counsel to choose and present
one central or a few key issues on appeal, Justice Jackson's arti-
cle, Advocacy Before the Supreme Court, 90 and an appellate prac-
tice manual9 ' were cited as authority. Reference was also made
lawyer argued some issues before the appellate court, but declined to ar-
gue every nonfrivolous claim that Barnes had requested him to present.
The Anders standard for judging the effectiveness of appellate counsel
requires "that [appointed counsel] support his client's appeal to the best
of his ability."
Id. at 437 (citation omitted). See supra note 32.
84. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
85. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 92 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
86. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
87. 103 S. Ct. at 3312 (emphasis added).
88. 665 F.2d at 433.
89. 103 S. Ct. at 3312.
90. 24 TEMP. L.Q. 115, 119 (1951).
91. B. STERN, APPELLATE PRAcTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 266 (1981).
to the current practical limitations encountered by counsel on ap-
peal, including page limitations on briefs and time limitations on
oral arguments.92
The majority also recognized the ethical considerations and in-
consistencies involved in representing a criminal defendant on
appeal.93 The Court viewed the Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct 94 as granting limited authority to the criminal client to de-
cide the plea to be entered, whether to waive a jury, and whether
to testify.95 Although the Court conceded that the ABA Stan-
dards for Criminal Appeals 96 appear to indicate that counsel
should accede to a client's insistence on pressing a particular is-
sue, Chief Justice Burger focused on the ABA Defense Function
Standards, 97 which provide that strategic and tactical decisions
are the exclusive province of the defense counsel, after consulting
with the client. The majority concluded its analysis of ethical
considerations by stating "the fact that the ABA may have chosen
to recognize a given practice as desirable or appropriate does not
mean that that practice is required by the Constitution."98
V. THE CONCURRING OPINION
Justice Blackmun, in his concurring opinion, viewed the issue
in a strictly ethical and procedural sense. He agreed with the dis-
sent 99 that, as an ethical matter, an attorney should argue on ap-
peal all nonfrivolous claims upon which his client insists. 0
However, Justice Blackmun agreed with the majority that the
ideal allocation of decision-making power between the attorney
and the client does not necessarily assume constitutional status
where counsel's performance is reasonable and assures the indi-
gent a fair presentation of claims.101 Justice Blackmun's remedy
92. 103 S. Ct. at 3313.
93. Id. at 3313 n.6.
94. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.




99. Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting.
100. 103 S. Ct. at 3314 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
101. Justice Blackmun stated:
I agree with the Court, however, that neither my view, nor the ABA's
view, of the ideal allocation of decision-making authority between client
and lawyer necessarily assumes constitutional status where counsel's per-
formance is "within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in
criminal cases," McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970) . . .and
"assure[s] the indigent defendant an adequate opportunity to present his
claims fairly in the context of the State's appellate process," Ross v. Mof-
fitt, 417 U.S. 600, 616 (1974) . . . I agree that both these requirements were
met here.
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for a failure to fulfil these requirements is a writ of habeas
corpus.10 2 He concluded by stating that counsel's failure to raise
nonfrivolous constitutional claims on appeal at the insistence of
his client must constitute "cause and prejudice" for a procedural
default under state law.103
VI. THE DISSENTING OPINION
A. Constitutional Definitions of Assistance of Counsel
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall in dissent, was in
fundamental disagreement with the majority over the meaning of
the sixth amendment right to the "assistance of counsel." Consti-
tutional sources for the well-established right to the assistance of
counsel for the indigent defendant were acknowledged, including
the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause and the due
process clause incorporation of sixth amendment standards.104
However, Justice Brennan believed that the Constitution does not
clearly define the phrase "assistance of counsel."' 05
Justice Brennan referred specifically to the function of counsel
under the sixth amendment. The protection of dignity and auton-
omy of a person on trial by assisting him in making his own
choices was required by the dissent to fulfill that function.106 An-
ders v. California107 and Faretta v. California'08 were cited as
clearly extending the defendant's interests in his case to matters
other than the basic structure of his case, such as how to plead
103 S. Ct. at 3314.
102. Id. However, the majority had previously noted as follows:
The only question present[ed] by this case is whether a criminal defend-
ant has a constitutional right to have appellate counsel raise every non-
frivolous issue that the defendant requests. The availability of federal
habeas corpus to review claims that counsel declined to raise is not before
us, and we have no occasion to decide whether counsel's refusal to raise
requested claims would constitute "cause" for a petitioner's default within
the meaning of Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977)....
103 S. Ct. at 3314 n.7.
103. Id. at 3314. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 78-80 (1977).
104. See supra notes 38, 57-59 and accompanying text.
105. The sixth amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense."
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See 103 S. Ct. at 3315-16 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ.,
dissenting).
106. 103 S. Ct. at 3316 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
107. 386 U.S. 738 (1967). See supra notes 32, 64 and accompanying texts.
108. 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (the state court erred in denying a defendant the right
to self-representation).
and whether to appeal.109 The dissent saw the proper role of
counsel in the wording of the constitutional provisions itself: to
assist the defendant with his case.110
B. Professional/Ethical Definitions of Assistance of Counsel
Justice Brennan also looked to the legal profession's conception
of its proper role in determining the meaning of "assistance of
counsel." The ABA Standards for Criminal Appeals state clearly
that counsel's role in an appellate proceeding is to advise the cli-
ent so that the client can make his or her own decisions."' Jus-
tice Brennan noted that the majority disregarded this clear
statement of the profession's definition of the "assistance of coun-
sel." 112 He also noted a distinction at the trial level, where deci-
sions must often be made quickly; however, a decision regarding
which issues to bring forth on appeal should be more
deliberate.113
C. An Attack on the Practicality of the Majority's Decision
Although Justice Brennan complimented the majority's advice
that good appellate advocacy demands selectivity among argu-
ments, constitutionality and other policies also should be weighed
in the balance. A constitutional rule that encourages attorneys to
disregard their client's wishes without cause could only exacer-
bate the client's probable suspicions of court-appointed attorneys.
In addition, Justice Brennan expressed his confidence in appel-
late judges' abilities to recognize arguments that are meritorious,
with truly skillful advocacy making a difference in only a few
cases.
114
The dissent's final disagreement with the majority centered on
the individual autonomy and dignity central to fifth and sixth
amendment rights. Justice Brennan criticized the majority's con-
ception of the defense attorney's role, that counsel should do
nothing beyond what the state considers important. Rather, he
saw the role of an attorney in the defense of the client "as the in-
strument and defender of the client's autonomy and dignity in all
109. 103 S. Ct. at 3316.
110. Id. at 3317.
111. See supra note 4.
112. 103 S. Ct. at 3317.
113. Id.
114. Justice Brennan commented that most clients would take their lawyers'
advice, however, he did not want to deepen the mistrust between clients and law-
yers in order to ensure "optimal presentation for that fraction-of-a-handful" of
cases where presentation may be determinative. Id. See infra note 127 and ac-
companying text.
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phases of the criminal process."" 5 Finally, Von Moltke v. Gil-
lies" 6 was cited in Brennan's dissent to illustrate, in the words of
Justice Black, that "undivided allegiance and faithful, devoted
service to a client are prized traditions of the American
lawyer.""l 7
VII. QUESTIONS RAISED
Prior to the Barnes" 8 decision, the question of division of
power between attorney and client stemmed from an ethical ori-
gin, as set out in the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility,
the Model Rules for Professional Conduct, and the ABA Stan-
dards for Criminal Justice."19 Due to the inconsistent interpreta-
tion and application of ethical standards by individual
attorneys, 120 the role of the indigent defendant in his defense is
unclear.
The Supreme Court's decision in Barnes is significant in that,
although it has clarified the constitutional question of the duty of
an appointed attorney to his indigent client, it raises and leaves
unanswered the ethical considerations. The Court cites the in-
consistencies among the ABA Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity, the Model Rules for Professional Conduct, and the ABA
Standards for Criminal Justice, but does not regard the practices
outlined as required by the Constitution.121 If the ethical stan-
dards are subject to various interpretations, however, the duty an
attorney has toward one client may differ from his duty toward
another client. If the standards differ between court-appointed
and retained counsel, a situation may occur in which the indigent
defendant is unable to raise certain claims on appeal due to coun-
sel's interpretation of the ethical duty. When a client with re-
tained counsel is able to raise the same claims on appeal due to
his counsel's interpretation of the ethical duty, the indigent client
may be denied, under equal protection, his right to effective coun-
115. Id.
116. 332 U.S. 708 (1948).
117. Id. at 725-26. 103 S. Ct. at 3319. The majority recognized that the record
was ambiguous with regard to what Barnes had requested. The Court, however,
assumed that Barnes insisted that his appellate counsel raise the issues and did
not simply accept counsel's decision not to press those issues. Id. at 3312 n.4.
118. 103 S. Ct. at 3308.
119. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
120. 103 S. Ct. at 3318 n.6 (Brennan, Marshall, J.J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 3313 n.6. See supra note 4.
sel on appeal. In this way, ethical practices may one day reach
constitutional status.
Another area open to question was that of the right to appeal.
The majority correctly recognized that there is no right to ap-
peal,122 although there is a right to counsel if appeal is granted.123
The dissent noted, however, that, as a practical matter, an appeal
of a criminal conviction is granted by the states and, therefore, re-
versal of the notion of no right to appeal is probably forthcom-
ing.' 24 If the indigent defendant's counsel does not interpret his
ethical duty in such a way as to raise all issues requested by the
client, the question remains whether the defendant has been de-
nied his right to appeal if the issue excluded was determinative.
The Court's analysis of Anders raises one final question. An-
ders125 requires counsel to file a brief raising the arguable issues
in order to withdraw from an appeal that he believes is frivo-
lous. 126 The Court failed to consider whether a similar document
should be required in order to determine if certain nonfrivolous
issues should be raised. This exclusion may have been due to the
fact that all of the issues demanded by Barnes concerned only
those excluded in the oral argument. 27 Counsel's brief concen-
trated on three of the seven meritorious issues suggested in the
letter to Barnes. 28 It did not raise any of the issues upon which
Barnes insisted. The Court may have considered Barnes' pro se
brief 129 to adequately represent, in writing, the issues demanded.
In this respect, the issues which Barnes insisted should be raised
would be only the issues not raised in oral argument. This would
alleviate the need for a document setting forth all nonfrivolous is-
sues, as they would be before the court in writing either in coun-
sel's or the defendant's brief.
A practical effect of the decision may be noted. It is possible
that the future criminal indigent defendant may become dis-
mayed with his counsel, depending upon which interpretation of
ethical standards the attorney practices. Unable to make a consti-
122. Id. at 3312.
123. Id. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). See also supra note 62
and accompanying text.
124. 103 S. Ct. at 3315 n.1.
125. 366 U.S. 738 (1967). See supra notes 32, 64 and accompanying text.
126. 386 U.S. at 744.
127. The dissent spoke of advocacy making a difference in only a few cases,
which indicates that only claims to be raised in oral argument were at issue. 103
S. Ct. at 3316. However, the majority spoke of both time limitations and brief page
number limitations as a rationale for allowing counsel to decide which issues to
raise on appeal. Id. at 3313 (quoting Jackson, Advocacy Before the Supreme Court,
25 TEMP. L.Q. 115, 119 (1951)).
128. 103 S. Ct. at 3311.
129. See supra notes 13, 23 and accompanying text.
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tutional demand for particular issues to be raised at his appeal,
the indigent defendant may choose pro se representation. If so,
Barnes will have created a block to the efficient and effective ad-
vocacy that the decision sought to ensure.130
VIII. CONCLUSION
Jones v. Barnes131 was the first determination by the Supreme
Court on the constitutional right of an indigent criminal defend-
ant to require his court-appointed counsel to raise certain nonfriv-
olous legal issues on appeal. Prior to Barnes, the allocation of
decision-making power between attorney and client was rooted in
the legal profession's ethical codes and manuals of standards. 132
Although the Court determined that the indigent defendant has
no constitutional right to require counsel to raise every nonfrivo-
lous issue on appeal, the ethical guidelines remain.133 For the at-
torney who considers the ethical codes standards manuals, which
are often subject to various interpretations, to require an attorney
to abide by the requests of the client,134 the decision in Barnes
will have no effect. For the attorney who reads his ethical duty to
the client as a limited one, the Barnes decision reinforces his in-
terpretation of the duty, but on constitutional grounds. 35 The in-
digent defendant's control over the issues on his appeal will,
therefore, depend entirely upon individual ethical interpretation
by attorneys, as the constitutional dimensions have now been
clearly provided by the Supreme Court.
CATHERINE D. PURCELL
130. The Court stated, "a duty [imposed on appointed counsel] to raise every
'colorable' claim suggested by a client would disserve the very goal of vigorous
and effective advocacy that underlies Anders." 103 S. Ct. at 3314.
131. Id. at 3308.
132. See supra note 4.
133. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL APPEALS, supra note 4.
134. See ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra note 4.
135. 103 S. Ct. at 3314.

